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INTERNATIONAL LAW
Can governmental action shield otherwise commercial activity
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?
by Michael P. Waxman
Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Specialist Hospital, Royspec
V.
Scott Nelson and Vivian Nelson
(Docket No. 91-522)
Argument Date: November 30, 1992
ISSUE
Does the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act confer juris-
diction over a suit by a United States citizen against a foreign
state alleging that the foreign state recruited him in this coun-
try for overseas employment and then imprisoned and tor-
tured him on account of his employment-related activity in
the foreign state?
FACTS
[There were no findings of fact in this case because the
Complaint was dismissed by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida for lack of jurisdiction
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (28
USC §§ 1330, 1601-1611). Therefore, all facts alleged by the
Nelsons, as well as those agreed to by the parties, must be
accepted as true by the Court for the purposes of this appeal.]
Petitioners are three governmental entities of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its
wholly owned and controlled King Faisal Specialist Hospital
(Hospital), and Royspec Purchasing Services (Royspec), a
wholly owned agent of the Hospital with offices in the
United States for purchasing and other purposes). Both par-
ties have agreed that Saudi Arabia is a "foreign state" and
that the Hospital and Royspec are each an "agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state" as defined in the FSIA (28 USC
§§ 1603 (a) and (b)).
Since 1973, Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) has
contracted with Saudi Arabia and the Hospital to recruit
expatriate personnel from the United States to work for the
Hospital. The Hospital has all of its facilities solely within
Saudi Arabia. In 1983, HCA announced a job opening at the
Hospital for a "monitoring systems engineer." While in the
United States, Scott Nelson, an American citizen, answered
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the advertisement and traveled to Saudi Arabia, where he
was interviewed by two Hospital officials. He returned to the
United States, where he concluded negotiations and signed
an employment contract with the Hospital in Miami, Florida,
in late November. He completed a short training and exami-
nation program in Tennessee and began work in Saudi
Arabia within a few weeks after signing the contract.
The following March, Nelson, as part of his job, discov-
ered alleged safety hazards. During the period from March to
August, 1984, he repeatedly reported these safety hazards to
Hospital officials. He was consistently told to ignore the
problem. He eventually reported them to an investigative
commission of the Saudi government. Nelson alleges that
due to his reports he was subjected to continuing harassment
by Hospital authorities. He requested to resign. They refused
to accept his resignation. In September, he was summoned
by Hospital employees to the Hospital's security office. Mr.
Nelson was taken to a jail cell where he alleges he was
"shackled, tortured and beaten" by Saudi agents and employ-
ees. He further alleges that he was imprisoned incommunica-
do, sometimes with little or no food, for 39 days without
being advised of the reasons he was taken and held. Further,
he alleges that a Saudi agent sought to extort "sexual favors"
form his wife, Vivian Nelson, to secure her husband's
release from jail. He was finally released, apparently without
ever being charged with any offense. Upon receiving their
passports a week later, the Nelsons returned to the United
States. Nelson claims that his injuries from the treatment
while in prison were so serious that he has been adjudged to
be permanently and totally disabled.
Saudi Arabia, without discussing the alleged arrest, tor-
ture, and resultant pain and suffering endured by the
Nelsons, claims that whatever actions it took resulted from
Scott Nelson's submission of a false diploma during the
employment application process.
On August 11, 1989, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida dismissed the Nelsons'
Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA. Because Saudi Arabia's Motion to Dismiss was an
immediate challenge to the court's jurisdiction, the court
held no evidentiary hearing and did not purport to resolve
any factual issues related to the asserted basis of jurisdiction.
The court held that neither the recruitment activities nor the
execution of the employment agreement in the United States
would "qualify as substantial contact" as required under the
FSIA "commercial activity" exception to foreign sovereign
immunity. Further, even if these commercial activities did
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constitute substantial contact with the United States, the
"nexus" between the causes of action alleged and those com-
mercial activities was "too tenuous to support jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign." Similarly, there was "no nexus
between Royspec's business and the torts alleged."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit unanimously reversed the lower court decision.
Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11 th Cir. 1991).
Accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true for the pur-
poses of resolving the appeal, including the allegations that
the three petitioners are alter egos, the Eleventh Circuit drew
no distinctions among the hospital, its agents, and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and referred to them "collectively"
as "Saudi Arabia." The Eleventh Circuit held that the link
with the United States, through employment recruitment in
this country, was substantial enough to warrant jurisdiction.
"[T]he detention and torture of Nelson are so intertwined with
his employment at the Hospital that they are 'based upon' his
recruitment and hiring, in the United States, for employment
at the Hospital in Saudi Arabia." The court of appeals also
found a sufficient "jurisdictional nexus" between Royspec's
commercial activity in the United States and the Nelsons'
claims.
Following the decision of the court of appeals, Saudi
Arabia requested a rehearing. The Eleventh Circuit denied
this request.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The decision in this case may be extremely important for
Americans working, or contemplating working, overseas. It
may also significantly affect foreign relations. The globaliza-
tion of business, and the need for highly qualified personnel
by the broad arms of foreign governments, is stimulating an
inexorable growth in transnational employment. This army of
expatriates includes many Americans who are often solicited
and employed in the United States, directly or indirectly by
foreign sovereigns, to work for the foreign sovereign in its
country. The practices of these foreign sovereigns regularly
blur or disregard the traditional demarcation line between
commercial endeavors and the exercise of sovereign powers.
The Court will consider, and perhaps address, whether these
expatriate Americans can obtain independent review and, if
appropriate, redress for injuries incurred due to the arbitrary
and sometimes violent practices of the host government in its
commercial endeavors.
Prior to 1952, the United States followed a policy exempt-
ing absolutely a foreign sovereign from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States. Conversely, many other sovereign
states distinguished between the public and commercial acts
of a foreign state in determining whether the courts of the
sovereign could have jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.
The former was called the "absolute theory" and the latter the
"restrictive theory."
In an attempt to conform U.S. policy with that of many of
its trading partners, the U.S. Department of State, through its
legal advisor, Mr. Jack B. Tate, advocated in a letter ("Tate
Letter") sent on behalf of the State Department to the
Attorney General of the United States in a 1952 case, that the
United States revise its policy and adopt the "restrictive theo-
ry" to foreign sovereign immunities cases before the courts of
the United States. Since the Constitution reserves matters
dealing with foreign relations to the executive branch of the
federal government, it was not surprising that the courts
adopted the views expressed in the Tate Letter. For 24 years,
United States courts generally followed the "restrictive theo-
ry." Of course, exceptions were made in cases where the
executive branch communicated that foreign sovereign
immunity should be applied, or waived, whatever the fact sit-
uation.
Finally, in 1976, in order to avoid the potential political
embarrassment when the executive branch selectively chose
not to intervene on behalf of a foreign sovereign who might
otherwise not be protected under the restrictive theory, and
the possible threat to the constitutionally mandated separa-
tion of powers by the courts taking orders from the executive
branch, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA) 28 USC §§ 1330, 1602-11. The FSIA exempts
absolutely from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States foreign sovereigns, their political subdivisions, agen-
cies or instrumentalities (28 USC § 1604). One of the few
exceptions from this immunity are claims relating to com-
mercial activities by the foreign sovereign (28 USC § 1605).
The relevant part of Section 1605 of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act provides:
"(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the juris-
diction of courts of the United States or of the States in any
case-(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state;
or upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or
upon an act outside the territory of the United States in con-
nection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States." (Emphasis added).
Definitional assistance in the reading of Section
1605(a)(2) is provided in Sections 1603(d) and (e). Section
1603(d) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides:
"(d) A 'commercial activity' means either a regular
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial
transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course
of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by ref-
erence to its purpose."
Section 1603(e) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
provides:
"(e) A 'commercial activity carried on in the United
States by a foreign state' means commercial activity carried
on by such state and having substantial contact with the
United States."
Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia, while implicitly conced-
ing that the Hospital was a commercial enterprise, argues
that the alleged violations flowed not from actions taking
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place in the United States, i.e., the conclusion of negotiations
and the execution of the contract and the limited training, but
happened, if at all, in Saudi Arabia and occurred as part of
the "police power" of the state. Saudi Arabia emphasized
that, in order to apply the commercial exception, "the action"
must be "based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States ..." (Section 1605(a)(2)), with the commercial
character of the activity determined by its nature (Section
1603(d)), and have "substantial contact with the United
States" (Section 1603(e)).
Saudi Arabia declares that the nature of the alleged harm-
ful actions were solely governmental, rather than commer-
cial, and thus are absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States. Further, even if they were
found to be commercial, since all the alleged harmful acts
took place in Saudi Arabia, the action cannot be based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States.
Ultimately, Saudi Arabia argues that the commercial activity
carried on in the United States was in effect, de minimus,
involving formalistic contracting with Scott Nelson and minor
paper processing, and therefore falls far short of the necessary
"substantial contact with the United States." Thus, the com-
mercial activity exception does not apply. See, Santos v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 934 F.2d 890 (7th Cir.
1991). Finally, Saudi Arabia asserts that Royspec took virtual-
ly no part, at any time, in the interactions with Scott Nelson,
especially in the acts complained of by the Nelsons, and
therefore should be removed as a party to the proceedings.
In a more dispassionate manner, the United States basical-
ly supports the piecemeal pleadings of Saudi Arabia. The
amicus brief did segregate the alleged failure-to-warn claim,
but declined to provide counsel as to its sovereign immunity
thinking on this point.
The Nelsons assert that the Eleventh Circuit rightfully
treated Saudi Arabia (through its actions as the owner of a hos-
pital), the Hospital and Royspec as one entity. They argue that
this entity carried on a commercial activity through a regular
course of commercial conduct-soliciting, hiring, and training
American citizens to be employed as expatriates working for
the Hospital in Saudi Arabia. Further, they assert that this com-
mercial activity by its regularity and pervasiveness, over many
years, clearly constituted substantial contact with the United
States. The Nelsons ask the Court to eschew the piecemeal
pleading of Saudi Arabia as to the nature of the specific harm-
ful acts and where they occurred as the commercial activity,
and instead to examine their alleged injuries as part of the
nature of the regular course of commercial conduct.
So examined, the action is based upon the employment
process, with the nature of its commercial conduct measured
as a whole rather than a piece at a time. It is within this con-
text that the Nelsons assert that Saudi Arabia's failure to dis-
close the possibility of these harmful actions in Saudi Arabia,
at or around the time of Scott Nelson's hiring in the United
States, breached an employer's duty to prevent employee
injury and warn of job-related dangers. Finally, the Nelsons
argue that since most of the harmful activities of which they
complain are in blatant violation of international minimum
human rights standards, and are condemned by all nations,
including Saudi Arabia, one cannot presume that the actions
taken against Scott Nelson were intended to be within the
governmental police powers of Saudi Arabia. See, Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (an "act of state"
doctrine case). Ultimately, the Nelsons assert, that since it is
for the courts of the United States to determine the breadth of
its own law, the characterization of these acts as governmen-
tal by Saudi Arabia is self-serving and should not be determi-
native of their treatment by the Court.
Despite the heavy judicial and political drama that sur-
rounds this case, and Saudi Arabia's not very veiled threats
about retaliation for a judgment finding commercial activity,
the real legal issues are matters of classic statutory interpreta-
tion. Unfortunately, due to a paucity of factually related
cases, the Court must review the legislative history and com-
mentaries to find support, much less guidance, for its analy-
sis. The difficulty courts have had in determining where
"nature" ends and "purpose" begins has been duly noted.
Segni v. Comm'l Office of Spain, 835 F.2d. 160 (7th Cir.
1987). While an important inquiry as to the nature of a for-
eign state's action is whether the particular actions are of the
type a private person would have engaged in, Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, 60 U.S.L.W. 450 (6/9/92), this analy-
sis fails where commercial acts have already begun and the
acts complained of could have been part of either a govern-
mental or a commercial response. Oddly enough, the few
factually related cases, Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) (a foreign hotel was
commercial activity for a torture case), and Berkovitz v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d. 329 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984), are not discussed by the par-
ties (Berkovitz was cited by the Nelsons in their Brief in
Opposition to certiorari). The Berkovitz court said, in dicta,
"If we assume by analogy that Berkovitz's employment,
through his company's contract with Iran, meets the require-
ments of commercial activity, the act of murder might then
become the "act" mentioned in § 1605(a)(2)."
Thus, unless the Court wants to return to the days of
executive branch communiques and signals of approval or
disapproval, it is compelled in this case to draw a line as to
the kinds of activities (including ones otherwise treated as
public acts of a sovereign that may have been recast as com-
mercial by the plaintiff or the sovereign) that may develop
from the commercial actions of the sovereign. With all due
deference to the attempts by the parties, and the United
States in its amicus brief, to avoid a direct statement of the
issue, the key question is whether the sovereign may use
means that might otherwise be treated as an exercise of sov-
ereign governmental power to address commercially created
problems and thereby avoid what would otherwise be under
the jurisdiction of the United States courts. Of course, if the
Court finds, as it is invited to do by Saudi Arabia and the
United States, that the commercial activity standard has not
been met, it can successfully delay this question until another
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day. The U.S. State Department, the courts of the United
States, and foreign sovereigns will breathe easier knowing
that numerous potential plaintiffs might be deterred.
ARGUMENTS
For Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Specialist Hospital, Royspec
(Counsel of Record, Everett C. Johnson, Jr.; Latham &
Watkins, 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, STE 1300,
Washington, DC 20004; telephone (202) 637-2200):
1. The Eleventh Circuit's holding contravenes the plain
meaning and structure of the FSIA's "commercial activity"
exception.
2. The legislative history of the FSIA confirms petitioners'
reading of the plain language of the "commercial activity"
exception.
3. The court of appeals' statutory construction conflicts with
the FSIA's underlying purpose of immunizing foreign
states from suits concerning the propriety of their public
acts.
4. Respondents' "duty to warn" negligence claims do not
fall within the "commercial activity" exception.
5. Respondents' claims do not have the required factual or
legal nexus with petitioners' activity in the United States.
6. Even if arguably relevant to respondents' claims, the
activities of Saudi Arabia and the Hospital did not have
"substantial contact" with the United States.
7. Royspec cannot be subjected to jurisdiction under the
"commercial activity" exception because it is a veritable
stranger to respondents' claims.
For Scott Nelson and Vivian Nelson (Counsel of Record,
Leonard Garment; Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, 2101 L
Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037; telephone (202) 785-
9700):
1. The FSIA confers jurisdiction over actions based upon
commercial activities of foreign states that have substan-
tial U.S. contact.
2. Nelson's intentional-tort claims are based upon the com-
mercial activities of the Hospital.
3. Nelson's negligence claims likewise are based upon the
commercial activities of the Hospital.
4. The commercial activities of the Hospital have substan-
tial contact with the United States.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Saudi Arabia, et aL
The United States (Counsel of Record, Kenneth W. Starr,
Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530; telephone (202) 514-2217).
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